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INTERVIEW WITH

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV
February 5, 1955

KINGSBURY SMITH said that Hearst and his companions, knowing
how busy N. S. Khrushchev was in connection with the Session of
the Supreme Soviet, were deeply grateful to him for finding the
time to receive them. All of them, Kingsbury Smith continued,
noted with great interest the favorable remarks made by Khrushchev in his recent speech at the meeting of the C.C. of the CPSU
about American methods of farming and especially his words to
the eHect that these methods could serve as a good example for /
Soviet agriculture. In this connection Hearst would like to ask
Khrushchev a question.
HEARST said that when he had read Khrushchev's favorable
appraisal of how maize and grain were grown in America, the
thought occurred to' him that it would be better if Soviet people
emphasized more often the good aspects of life in the United
States, and Americans the good aspects of life in the USSR. At
the present time, however, they too often criticized each other
and dwelt little on positive facts.
Hearst asked whether Khrushchev agreed.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV replied that he agreed, and considered
that this would be very useful. In his opinion there was much that
was good in America. He thought that Americans too would find
in the Soviet Union n1uch that was interesting and useful to them.
This applied not only to agriculture but also to industry and other
fields.
HEARST said that inasmuch as Khrushchev spoke favorably of
certain aspects of American life, he wanted to express the hope
that Krushchev would find it possible to visit the United States
some day (just as he and his companions had been given the
opportunity to visit the Soviet Union), in order to acquaint himself personally with American agriculture, industry etc., since, as
far as he knew, Khrushchev had never been to the U.S .A.
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N. S. KHRUSHCHEV cconflrmecl that he in fact had never been to
the United States.
KINGSBURY SMITH asked whether Khrushchev would be prepared
to visit the U.S.A. and acquaint himself with American farming
methods, especially in livestock raising, if he were to receive an
thvit~tibh to go there at a time that was convenient for him.
N. S. IarnUSlICHEV replied that he would like to combine his
dhSwers to Hearst and Kingsbury Smith. He thought that mutual
yisits to countries, if not of a prejudiced character, were always of
benefit to the peoples. In his opinion, visits to the United States
by Soviet people would be useful both from an economic standpoint and for better mutual understanding. Comrade Mikoyan had
been to the United States and had much that was interesting
and favorable to say of what he had seen there.
KINGSBURY SMITH remarked that V. M. Molotov had also been
to the United States.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV replied that Comrade Molotov had been to
the United States during and shortly after the war. He had not
had the opportunity to acquaint himself thoroughly w~th the
country as Comrade Mikoyan had done.
As for a visit by himself to the United States, that of course
would be difficult at the present time, though, as he had said, there
was much in the United States that was interesting and instructive in agriculture and the farm machinery industry in particular.
Insofar as the organization of agriculture was concerned, naturally
his interlocutors were not attracted by the collective-farm system,
while Soviet people, for their part, were not attracted by the American principles of organization of agriculture. That, however, should
not prevent one from seeing what was good in the U.S. in the realm
of livestock raising, the farm machinery industry etc. Moreover,
it had to be said that American agriculture was conducted very
economically, with a big saving of labor power.
Considering his position as Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, he wondered whether even one influential person
could be found in the U.S.A. who would venture to invite him.
Would it not be said in the U.S.A. that he was coming with the
intention of blOWing up the American system? In this connection
Khrushchev remarked jokingly that he was afraid that Hearst would
have to, explain himself before McCarthy's investigating committee
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regarding his conversation with the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
As for his making a trip to the United States, that depended
on many things. At the present time, Americans were not granting
visas, not only to people like himself but even to ordinary Soviet
editors of student newspapers, a fact which seemed very strange.
HEARST said that he and his companions had noted with great
interest the decision of the Soviet Government once again to lay
stress on the development of heavy industry. Did this mean that
it was considered necessary to concentrate greater attention on
increasing the defense potential, or was the new program aimed
at expansion of the means of production for the subsequent production of consumer goods?
N. S. KIrnUSHCHEV replied that the Soviet Government's measures for expansion of output of consumer goods had evidently
been lnisunderstood abroad to imply curtailment of the development of heavy indush·y. We, said Khrushchev, are of the opinion,
as we always have been and will continue to be, that all branches
of industry must develop proportionally, with heavy industry advancing ahead of the others. Why is this necessary? Because heavy
industry creates the means O'f production, and in order to raise
living standards it is necessary to expand the productive forces,
and it is necessary to have mechanization. But without metal, machines and electric power, mechanization is impossible. Hence,
heavy industry constitutes the base for the development of the
national economy.
To take an example, the recent meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a decision on the further development of animal husbandry. What is animal husbandry? In essence
it means the production of goods for popular consumption. But
the development of animal husbandry is impossible without the
development of heavy industry, which provides agriculture with
tractors, farm machinery etc. Thus, one may say that if the entire
national economy is regarded as a complex made up of the various
branches of the economy, heavy industry must occupy the key
position in the complex.
As for the question of whether the development of heavy industry was designed for defense or for peaceful consumption, he,
Khrushchev, must say that in the Soviet Union the one was not
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counterposed to the other. We, said Khrushchev, are Communists,
and for us to spend money on defense is a matter of compulsion.
We should like to have the opportunity not to spend the people's
money for defense. He, Khrushchev, believed that some day such
a possibility would arise. But the present international situation
compelled the Soviet Union to use part of its resources for defense.
Americans considered that the Soviet Union was to blame for the
present international tension. But Soviet people considered that
the one to blame was the United States, which set up its military
bases around the Soviet frontiers and wanted to talk with the
Soviet Union from CCpositions of strength," as Churchill put it and
as was often repeated by Dulles and others. Be that as it may, under
present conditions the Soviet Union was compelled to assign part
of its resources and efforts to increasing the defensive capacity
of the country.
But our main aim, N. S. Khrushchev continued, is to make our
people happy, to raise the people's living standards. We want not
only our people but also the other peoples to be happy. The ultimate aim must not be to produce ever more guns and atom bombs:
that ~s a result of the present abnormal international relationships.
It cannot be considered that guns and bombs make up a country's
wealth. The fact is rather that they stand in the .way of the possibility of raising the living standard of the population.
KINGSBURY SMITH thanked Khrushchev for his reply.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV said that he would like to elaborate on his
remarks about the (Cpositions of strength" policy. He held that this
was a very dangerous policy, in that both sides were obliged to
build up their forces, each trying to become stronger than the opposing side. This led to the build-up of the means of waging war.
When huge material reserves of weapons were accumulated the
situation was always fraught with the danger of an outbreak of war.
Relations between countries should be based not on a "positions
of sb'ength" policy, but on mutual understanding. For this it was
necessary in the first place to develop normal trade on mutually
advantageous terms. It was necessary not to threaten other countries. The madmen who brandished the atom bomb had to be
·called to order. This would set people's minds at rest.
On its part (Khrushchev went on) the Soviet Union is striving
to develop normal business and trade relations with other countries,

6

so that these normal relations can become stronger and grow into
friendly relations. There are no contentious issues as between the
Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet people entertain
friendly feelings for the American people. But if the American
Government wants something of the Soviet Union, it is certain
that it will get nothing by means of extortion and threats. Nothing
will come of threats and attempts at intimidation, because the
Soviet Union has never and will not give in ta threats. If the
American Government wants something of the Soviet Union, it
can get it only on the basis of normal relations, on the basis of
normal trade.
He, Krushchev, believed that forces would emerge, that common sense would prevail, sa that an improvement in the relations
between the two countries would be reached. As for himself, he
stood for normal relations, for normal trade, for the development
of trade between the USSR and the U.S.A.
KINGSBURY SMITH said that American leaders considered that
they had made attempts to reach mutual understanding with the
Soviet Union from positions which in their opinion were positions
of weakness, and had found that that was impossible. This perhaps
led them to the idea that if there was any hope of regulating relations with the Soviet Union, the West had first of all to arrive at a
position which American leaders could regard as one of parity
of strength or apprOXimate equilibrium. The United States had
disarmed immediately after the war. Yet, information at the disposal of the American leaders had given them grounds to believe
that the Soviet Union had not maintained a similar pace of disarmament.
HEARST remarked that the Americans had displayed goodwill
during the war, for instance, in the sphere of Lend-Lease, and also
by their offer to the USSR and the People's Demacracies to avail
themselves of the advantages of the Marshall Plan.
KINGSBURY SMITH went on to say that in his opinion American
leaders had no desire to impose their will on the Soviet Union
or to extort anything from it. More than anything, they wanted
peace and friendship with the Soviet Union.
HEARST added that neither in the American Constitution nor in
the works of outstanding American leaders and thinkers was there
anything similar to the teaching of Lenin and Marx to the effect
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that the two systems were incompatible, and that one of them
must perish. That was one of the questions troubling Americans,
for they felt that the long-term plans of the Soviet Union reHected
that teaching.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV remarked that a position of strength and a
position of weakness were, of course, different things. Soviet people
admitted that each country had a right to _and should think of its
security and establish such armed forces as are able to guarantee
its security. This was, however, the parity of strength of vvhich Mr.
Kingsbury Smith spoke. Yet, Churchil and subsequently Dulles
had put forward the slogan of pursuing a "positions of strength"
policy. And this meant that one side wanted to dictate its will to
others, wanted to be stronger than others. Such a policy was fraught
with serious danger. If one side continued to build up its strength,
the other side was forced to do likewise, which only made the
atmosphere more heated. He said that he believed that the "positions of strength" policy was a misguided one because it was fraught
with the danger of unleashing another war.
As for the remark that after the war the United States had
demobilized while the Soviet Union had not done so, he stated
that he would like to point out firstly that while America's losses
in the last war were counted in tens of thousands, those of the
Soviet Union were counted in millions. What did this show? That
the whole Soviet people, the entire country, was mobilized during
the v/ar. Mter the war the Soviet armed forces had been demobilized and only the strength necessary for the security of the
country had been retained.
If one proceeded from the real facts, they did not confirm the
assertion made by Hearst and often made by other prominent
figures in the West, that the Soviet Union had retained bigger
armed farces than the West and that these armed forces represented
a threat.
The Soviet Union did not want to act to the detriment of its
allies in the struggle against Hitlerism. It was known that five
years ago the United States was less highly mobilized than now.
If the Soviet Union had wanted to attack the West, it should according to the viewpoint of those who considered that an attack
should be made at the moment most advantageous to the attacker,
have done so at that time. The Soviet Union? however, had not dane
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so. why? Because the Soviet Union was a peace-loving country,
because the Soviet people were against war, although they would
defend their country if it were attacked, and there need be no
doubt that they would do everything necessary ta rout the aggressors. This had been borne out by historical experience.
As for the question of Lend-Lease, it could not be denied that
Lend-Lease was of substantial help during the war. It would be
\vrong to deny this. But he· wanted to remind his questioners that
the Soviet Union paid for Lend-Lease with blood. NO' gold, no
goods could compensate for the blood shed by the Soviet people
in the struggle for the common cause. The Soviet people could tell
their former American partners in the joint struggle against Hitlerite Germany that they, the Soviet people, had fought selflessly and
honestly against the common enemy and won victory.
Much had already been said about the Marshall Plan. Soviet
people held, and continued to hold, that the Marshall Plan had
political aims, that -it was an attempt, under the guise of giving
material aid, to establish control over other countries, ta subordinate them. But if this was possible of achievement with regard to
Greece or some other country, the Soviet Union had never bartered
and never would barter its independence for sausage or other goods.
Now (Khrushchev went on) as to the question of peaceful coexistence of the capitalist and the socialist systems. It goes without
saying that the problem of coexistence is a big one. The fact that
in our day there exist simultaneously on the one hand capitalist
America, capitalist Britain and other capitalist countries, and on
the other hand the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China
and other People's Democracies, in which the national economy
is run on socialist lines, speaks for itself. We all, N. S. Khrushchev
remarked, live on one globe, and there is nowhere else we can
go. You are against Communism and Socialism, he said, we are
against capitalism. Weare building and developing our economy
on the principles of Socialism. You want economy to be built on
capitalist principles. To this we have said and say now: Build ta
your heart's content, but do not interfere with us. The situation
has developed in which two systems exist simultaneously in the
,vorld. You, perhaps, will regard this as the way of providence.
We consider it a result of historical development. You hald that
capitalism is immutable, that the future belongs to the capitalist
system. We, on our part, consider that Communism is invincible

9

and. that the future beiongs to the Communist system. These are
two diametrically opposite views.
.
What is the way out? Some over-eager hot-heads see the way
out in 'Y'ar. But this is a stupid way out. Following the behests of
the great Lenin, we stand for prolonged, peaceful coexistence of
the two systems, that is, we have held and continue to hold that
these two systems can live side by side without fighting.
As to how long this coexistence can last, the answer is that that
will depend on historical conditions, on historical development.
In the opinion of Soviet people, one nation cannot impose its state
system on another nation. If the American people prefer to live
in capitalist conditions, let that be so, no one will hinder them.
I, as a Communist, N. S. Khrushchev said, sympathize with the
Communists. My interviewers sympathize with the capitalists, moreover they are themselves capitalists, nevertheless all of us are engaged in a peaceful conversation. If such a thing is possible around
this table, Khrushchev continued, in his opinion it is also possible
in relations between the two systems-the capitalist and the socialist.
HEARST remarked that on a diplomatic plane the USSR and the
United States were coexisting in the United Nations all the time.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV agreed with this and further said that his
interviewers of course considered that capitalism would triumph.
Soviet people believed that Communism would triumph. When
this would come about was not known. As for the future development of the United States, this would depend upon the American
people themselves and no one could settle this question for them.
Tsar Nikolai the . Second had probably considered ten years before
the October Revolution that his throne was unshakable, that it
would stand through eternity. Yet, ten years later not even a trace
remained of it, and it was Russian workers and peasants, and not
the Americans, who overthrew ~ussian tsarism. No one could tell
how events would develop in other countries, for example in the
United States. In America there was a powerful working 'class and
sooner or later it would raise its voice. But it was the American
people, and the American people alone, who would decide what
system would triumph in the United States.
It seemed to him, Khrushchev, that American political leaders
well understood all this but that they incorrectly interpreted the
principle of coexistence in order to stir up the feelings of the Ameri-
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cans against the USSR and to try to convince them that the Soviet
Union wanted war. This was a slander on the Soviet Union. Soviet
people stood for lasting coexistence of the two systems.
KINGSBURY SMITH remarked that it seemed to the American
employers that the American working class very often raised its
voice, demanding higher wages.
HEARST added that the workers were raising their voices in
every strike.
.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV answered that this was, of course, a domestic
affair of the American people.
HEARST said that in view of N. S. Khrushchev's statement that
it should be left for the American people to decide this question
for themselves, he would like to point out that it was precisely the
American people who were given the opportunity of deciding this
question at every election. For his part he would like to say the
same about the Russian people too, namely that the question O'f
the internal structure of the Soviet Union should be settled by the
Russian people themselves. He added that he did not, of course,
venture to foretell what the final decision would be.
CONIFF asked whether N. S. Khrushchev could say what in his
opinion were the prospects of preserving peace in the Far East,
in view of the fact that he had been in Peking and had conferred
\-vith the leaders of the Chinese Government.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV replied that the question was posed in such
a way that in replying to it he would have to speak for the Chinese
Government and this would run counter to the agreement already
reached between him and his interlocutors that each nation had to
speak for itself. For this reason he could speak only for himself
taking into account the sober-mindedness of the Chinese leaders,
and their ability to govern the country and to make the correct decisions. It should be borne in mind that the leaders of People's China
had the experience of 30 years of war against the forces of internal
reaction and against the Japanese and other imperialists. The
Chinese people had shown by deeds that they wholeheartedly supported the Communist leaders of new China.
N. S. Khrushchev went on to say that although he knew whom
he was talking with, he had to' say that he could not understand
the current actions of the United States or find any justification
for them. The declaration that Taiwan and the other Chinese
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islands were non-Chinese territory was at variance with existing
international agreements and historical facts. This could not be
called anything but perfidy. Could China really recognize that the
United States had the right to claim Taiwan or could she agree
that Taiwan was necessary to secure the defense of the United
States? If one considered the distance between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan on the one hand, and between the United States
and Taiwan on the other, it would become clear that no comparison
was possible. Khrushchev said that in his opinion the current actions of the United States in the area of Taiwan were a disgrace
to the American people. No sensible people, irrespective of their
political views, would ever justify a conHict caused by the policy
of the United States. As for future developments in that area, they
would depend on the United States itself. Could China really
recognize that the United States or its puppet, the scoundrel Chiang
Kai-shek, had the right to Taiwan? N. S. Khrushchev added that
Chiang Kai-shek reminded him of Pu Yi, the puppet emperor whom
the Japanese had installed in Manchuria at one time.
The Soviet people, N. S. Khrushchev added, were shocked by
the actions of the U.S. Government. They had known and respected
Eisenhower as their partner in the war against -Hitler. They failed
to understand the United States policy on the question of Taiwan
and felt that the American people themselves hardly understood
this policy. The United States was carrying on unprecedented activity in the Far East and artificially complicating the situation,
evidently under the influence of the most reactionary elements.
If America showed common sense in this question, and he did
not doubt China's common sense, it would be possible, with the
participation of other countries interested in the preservation of
peace, to prevent a conflict in the Far East.
KINGSBURY SMITH asked whether one might consider the Soviet
Union to be among the 0 the reo u n t r i e s mentioned by N. S.
Khrushchev.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV replied that this was not excluded. The
Soviet Union was interested in the preservation of peace. It was
willing to do everything in its power to facilitate a correct solution
of the problem and the prevention of a new war.
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KINGSBURY SMITH observed that in his opinion neither the American Government nor the American people doubted the fact that
Formosa as such was part of China. V. M. Molotov, in the interview with Hearst and himself, had recalled that the President of
the United States had declared again in 1950 that the United
States regarded Formosa as belonging to China. At present, however, a question had arisen, which in the opinion of the American
leaders (and in his opinion, the American people understood their
position) was directly related to the security of the entire Pacific
area and to the cause of world peace. In this connection he would
like to recall that the United States some time ago had withdrawn
their troops from Korea for the sake of peace. In a comparatively
short period of time, however, a war had broken out there which in
the final count created a threat to peace in the Far East if not
throughout the world. That is why the United States would not be
inclined to deprive Formosa of its protection until it considered
that peace was ensured, although the U.S.A. did not want to deprive China of Taiwan or any other territory. Herein lay the cause
of the current American policy.
Kingsbury Smith went on to say that he and his companions
were very grateful to N. S. Khrushchev for the frank exchange of
opinion and that they thought that such an exchange of opinion
could only be of benefit in elucidating the position of both sides.
HEARST also expressed gratitude for the friendly and frank
conversation.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV said that he would like to add that it was
clear to him what policy United States ruling quart-ers were pursuing towards the People's Republic of China, but he considered
that this policy was neither wise nor farsighted. It seemed that
the men responsible for this policy were not guided by common
sense but by hatred for the Chinese people. This would be just
like an armed man entering another man's house and saying that
if the owner tried to turn him out there would be no mutual understanding but that a threat of war would arise. It went without
saying that China would not give in to such threats. China was a
great and proud power, the Chinese people would not bow their
heads to anyone and would not submit to extortion. Of course,
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Khrushchev said, this was not his business, but he was convinced
that if the United States found itself in such a position, it would
also refuse to submit to such a humiliation as that demanded of
China. And the United States would be just as right as the Chinese
were noW.
Speaking about the past, Khrushchev said that he had to point
out that in his opinion there had also been gross intervention in
the civil war in Korea and this intervention hJld not helped to
raise the prestige of the United States. It was a good thing that the
war in Korea had ended, that the conflagration there had been
put out, and the Soviet Union would not want it to break out anew
anywhere else.
" N. S. Khrushchev added that he, like his interviewers, was
satisfied with the meeting and grateful for the frank conversation.
We, said N. S. Khrushchev, are men belonging to' different classes,
but I think that as men we must have something in common-the
interests of peace. If we help to' promote mutual understanding,
if we try to reduce international tension and to create conditions
for nO'rmal coexistence, that will promote the consolidation of world
peace.
HEARST said that he could express nothing but thanks for the
conversation and asked N. S. Khrushchev to excuse them for having
taken up so much of his time.
- He would like to say, not for propaganda purposes and not in the
fom1 of a question, that he would nO't like N. S. Khrushchev to
proceed on the ssumption that the Americans hated the Chinese
people. This would be the wrong point of departure. On the contrary, they had been fighting shoulder to shoulder in the last war,
-and even earlier the United States had frequently rendered assistance to China. If one were to speak of the feelings of the Americans towards the Chinese people, they were not to be characterized
as feelings of hatred but as those of the greatest goodwill.
KINGSBURY SMITH said that the American people were, of course,
worried over the incident of the American airmen being sentenced
to imprisonment in China. The Americans regarded this as a violation of the Korean armistice agreement and this incident undoubtedly tended to give rise to' feelings of ill will for the Chinese
people on the part of American: people.
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CONNIFF asked whether in N. S. Khrushchev's opinion there was .
a possibility of securing a settlement of the question of the American airmen who, as even the Soviet representative to the United
Nations admitted, had been taken prisoner in uniform. Such a
gesture as the release of the airmen could be a first step towards
:
bringing about a change in the situation.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV pointed out that he would like in the first
place to reply to the expression of goodwill towards the Chinese
people. The point was, he said, that it was not by words but by
deeds that the Chinese people judged anyone's attitude towards
them, and the deeds O'f the United States were such that they
threatened China with war. How could one reconcile this with
goodwill? Could it be that they had a different China in mind and
that when certain Americans spoke of China they were evidently
referring to Chiang Kai-shek? Yet Chiang Kai-shek was not China
but an offscouring of China However, American ruling circles
should soberly face the facts and at last see the real China-the '
Chinese People's Republic and its Government led by Mao Tse-tung.
They should recall their troops from Chinese territory, ~hich would,
of course, help to establish normal relations between China and
the United States.
As regards the question of the airmen, Khrushchev said that
he would hesitate to say anything on this matter. The United Nation Secretary General Hammarskjoeld, who had Hown specially
to Peking to discuss this matter, could probably set forth the viewpoint of the People's Republic of China better than he, who had
not discussed this case with the Chinese leaders.
N. S. Khrushchev said that he could well understand the feelings of the fellow countrymen of the airmen. But this matter was
connected with a court case, . the case of law of the country. That
is why is seemed to him, Khrushchev, that if the Americans showed
more common sense, if the Americans recognized the legal rights
of the Chinese state it would be possible to find a more favorable
solution to this problem. N. S. Khrushchev said that he would like
to' repeat that he was of course expressing only his own opinion,
but it seemed to him that the airmen question was not a conflict
that could not be solved. It was a question of the sovereignty of
the state, and the Government of the United States should under-

stand this.
KINGSBURY SMITH said that in conclusion he would like to make
an unofficial and maybe an indiscreet remark. The Western press,
and especially the London newspaper The Times~ was writing a
great deal about differences between N. S. Khrushchev and G. M.
Malenkov. But as he and his companions had been present at the
Session of the Supreme Soviet and had seen how N. S. Khrushchev
and G. M. Malenkov sat side by side in friendly discussion, they
had come to the conclusion that all these assertions were baseless.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV replied that these newspapers probably took
their wishes for reality.
KINGSBURY SMITH asked whether they could refer to N. S.
Khrushchev:>s answer.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV replied that this was up to them.
In conclusion, N. S. Khrushchev said jokingly that if Hearst
should be called before McCarthy:>s committee on his return to
America, he, Khrushchev would be able to attest that Hearst had
actively defended the interests of his Government throughout the
conversation.
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INTERVIEW WITH

N. A. BULGANIN
February 12, 1955
KINGSBURY SMITH said that he and his companions were highly
grateful for the opportunity accorded them to meet and conv~rse
with leaders of the Soviet Government as well as with noted personalities of Soviet culture. They were, in particular, deeply grateful to N. A. Bulganin for having made it possible tO'receive them.
They had received the communication regarding a possible meeting with him at the airport in Leningrad.
Attending the Session of the Supreme Soviet, Hearst and his
companions, Kingsbury Smith continued, noted V. M. Molotov's
statement to the effect that the Soviet Union had now surpassed
the United States in the production of hydrogen weapons. They
also noted the statements made by Soviet leaders in interviews with
them as well as at the Session of the Supreme Soviet concerning the
desire of the Soviet Government to put an end to the armaments
race. They all knew the viewpoint, emanating from scientific circles,
especially in the West, concerning the threats to mankind spelled
by the continuing unrestricted explosions of atomic bombs for
experimental purposes. In this connection Hearst would like to
make a proposal.
N. A. BULGANIN observed that he would hear Hearst with
interest.
HEARST thanked N. A. Bulganin and expressed confidence that
the Government and people of the United States shared the desire
for peace that was expressed also by the Soviet Government.
In view of the fact that the explosions of thermo-nuclear weapons for experimental purposes were a threat to all mankind he,
Hearst, ,vould like to ask whether the Soviet Government would be
prepared, even before the prohibition of atomic weapons, to conclude an agreement with the United States and other Western
Powers restricting the number of explosions for experimental purposes. Such an agreement would not necessitate the establishment
of a control system since either side would immediately know of
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any breach of such an agreement.
In his, Hearsfs, opinion this was possibly the only way to start
disarmament in the field of atomic weapons.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that in this matter it was necessary to
proceed in a more radical way, as proposed by the Soviet Government. It proposed the complete outlawing of atomic, hydrogen and
ot~er \veapons of mass destruction, discontinuance of the manufacture of these weapons, and also the elimination from the armaments
of states of whatever had already been produced in this field. _
Practically speaking, the proposal to restrict the tests would to
all intents and purposes yield nothing. The peoples O'f the world
knew that there were bombs already prepared and tested in the
storehouses of both sides. Therefore an agreement to restrict explosions for experimental purposes would not allay anybody's anxiety.
It might be said that the question of discontinuing further explosions for experimental purposes was now being raised because
sufficient stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction had already
been accumulated. This would not ao away with the anxiety.
The Soviet Government had been and was posing the question
in a more radical way. It proposed to ban the production, storage
and use of mass destruction weapons. It was .in this direction that
it was necessary to work and secure agreement.
KL~GSBURY SMITH said that he would like to clarify Hearst's
proposal. It was a matter not of the complete discontinuance of explosions for experimental purposes, but of restricting the number
of such explosions. Possibly the Soviet Union and the United
States as well were not prepared at present to go as far as complete
discontinuance of experimental explosions. However, bearing in
mind the warnings of scientists about the danger of unrestricted
explosions, would not the Soviet Union deem it pos~ible as a first
step towards the eventual prohibition of mass destruction weapons
to restrict, on the basis of an agreement with the Western Powers,
the number of experimental explO'sions to 5, 10 or 15 a year?
Unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Government to move in
this direction would give rise to some disappointment on the part
of public opinion.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that the Soviet Union was prepared to
cO'nsider any proposals designed to remove the threat of the use
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of mass destruction weapons, if these proposals were really directed
to that end.
.
.
HEARST said that last evening he had spoken with his office in
New York and was informed that the speeches of N. A. Bulganin
and V. M. Molotov at the Session of the Supreme Soviet were
construed as containing attacks upan the U.S. Government; and
that in this connection there was some speculation in the U.S.A. as
to whether the change in leadership of the Soviet Government
might mean that the latter intended to adopt a more antagonistic
stand towards the United States.
In this connection he, Hearst, would like to ask whether N. A.
Bulganin thought that the change in leadership signified a change
in the Soviet Union's attitude to,;vards the United States.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that it did not mean that.
HEARST and KINGSBURY SMITH observed that they were glad to
hear it.
.
CONNIFF said that during their intervie,v with N. S. Khrushchev
last week the latter had said that it was unfair to arouse U.S. public opinion against the USSR and to try to create the impression
that the USSR wanted war. At the same time one could get the
impression from V. M. Molotov's statement at the Session 'of the
Supreme Soviet that the United States for its part wanted war. The
American people would surely consider that attempts to create
such an impression were likewise unfair.
Did N. A. Bulganin consider in this connection that it would
help to strengthen peace if Soviet official spokesmen were to' refrain
from making attacks on the U.S.A. and if American official spokesnlen did likewise in relation to the USSR?
N. A. BULGANIN replied that in his opinion that would be useful.
As for the speech of V. M. ~1010tov to which Coniff referred, it
constituted a fully objective appraisal of facts, and · of facts alone,
and it fully expressed the viewpoint of the Soviet Government.
KINGSBURY SMITH observed that Molotov in his report spoke
repeatedly a bout the aggressive intentions of the American Government and intimated that the United States was preparing war.
Yet American people were sure that their Government had no
aggressive intentions. The American people knew that President
Eisenhower had refrained from actions in the Indo-China area as
well as in that of Formosa, w~i~ might have unleashed- a major
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conflict. When the Americans read such statements by Soviet officials they got the impression that the Soviet Government either
had a wrong conception of the stand of the U.S. Government, or
else deliberately wanted to set other countries against the United
States. This, naturally, increased the anxiety of the American peo·
pIe and strengthened their conviction that the United States had
to have military bases at its disposal.
It was not quite clear to him, Kingsbury Smith went on, how
these attacks on the U.S. Government could be reconciled with the
assurances given by Soviet officials in private talks with them, and
:also at the Session of the Supreme Soviet, to the effect that the
Soviet Government wished to improve relations with the U.S.A.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that the Soviet representatives were
fully sincere in speaking of their desire to establish good, normal
relations with the U.S. Government. He had pointed out in his
speech at the Session that during the war, for instance, the Soviet
Union had had good relations with the United States, Britain, and
also France, which later jOined that grouping; and the Soviet Union
would be fully satisfied if these relations were to be re-established
now. Both V. M. Molotov and he, Bulganin, had spoken at the
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Government's desire to
contribute to the relaxation of all existing international tension.
The Soviet Government really wanted this and he believed that
this was likewise desired by all the peoples of the world.
Kingsbury Smith had said that V. M. Molotov's report was
giving rise to certain sentiments in the United States, but these
were provoked by incorrect information about the report, deliberately, in order to justify the establishment of American war bases
around the Soviet Union and close to its frontiers . It was known,
in any event, that those war bases had been set up long before
Molotov and Bulganin made their speeches. Their establishment
had nothing to do with the statements by Soviet leaders.
KINGSBURY SMITH thanked N. A. Bulganin for his elucidation.
HEARST said that February 12 marked the anniversary of the
birth of Abraham Lincoln, one of the great political and, one might
say, spiritual leaders of the American people. Lincoln said in his
Gettysburg Address: government of the people, by the people, for
the people, shall not perish from the earth.
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HEARST asked whether N. A. Bulganin wanted to' make any
comment on Lincoln's words.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that it was a good quotation, an intelligent statement by a great man.
HEARST asked if N. A. Bulganin had heard of the quotation
before.
N. A. BULGANIN replied in the negative.
KINGSBURY SMITH asked for permission to put a question concerning the machinery of government of the Soviet state. It was
not quite clear to him and his companions when and at what level
the decision to permit G. M. Malenkov to retire and to appoint
N. A. Bulganin as the new Prime Minister, which was subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Soviet, had originally been taken.
Would it be right to say that this decision had originally been taken
by the Central Committee of the CPSU and then submitted to the
Supreme Soviet?
N. A. BULGANIN replied that, as reported in the press, the proposal to appoint a new Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the USSR had been submitted to the Supreme Soviet by Deputy
N. S. Khrushchev on behalf of the Central Committee and the
Council of Elders. In the Soviet Union there was a bloc of Communists and non-party people.
KINGSBURY SMITH asked whether it was correct that the procedure of G. M. Malenkov's retirement and N. A. Bulganin's appointment as the new Prime Minister meant that the principle of
collective leadership was being preserved.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that the principle of collective leadership was, unquestionably, inviolate.
KINGSBURY SMITH said that it was not clear from the press
whether G. M. Malenkov remained a member of the Presidium of
the Central Committee of the CPSU and asked whether this was so.
N. A. BULGANIN replied in the affirmative.
CONNIFF safd that the opinion still prevailed in the West that
the Soviet Government's ultimate aim was to spread Communist
domination throughout the world. He asked N. A. Bulganin to
state his views on the matter.
.
N. A.. BULGANIN replied that Hearst, Kingsbury Smith and
Conniff had already had a lengthy talk on the subject with N. S.
Khrushchev, who had given an exhaustive reply to Conniff's ques-
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tion. This reply had been published in the press. He, Bulganin,
could add nothing to N. S. Khrushchev's words.
CONNIFF thanked N. A. Bulganin for his reply and went on to
say that the change of leadership in the Soviet Government had
naturally given rise to a spate of conjecture of increased military
influence on the Soviet Union's policy in view of the fact that
Marshal Bulganin had now been appointed Prime Minister, and
Marshal Zhukov Minister of Defense.
CONNIFF asked N. A. Bulganin whether the Soviet Government
now intended to rely more on the experience of military leaders in
conducting its policy.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that the policy of the Soviet Government had been outlined in sufficient detail in his statement at the
Session of the Supreme Soviet and that in his opinion this statement
provided an exhaustive answer to Conniff's question.
KINGSBURY SMITH said that in the West the opinion prevailed
that the key to lasting peace lay in disarmament, and that the key
to disarmament was to be found in setting up an effective system
of international control with inspection, on a permanent basis, with
regard to all types of weapons, including atomic weapons.
He asked N. A. Bulganin to give his views on the possibility of
reaching such agreement.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that the Soviet Government had submitted its proposals on this question. The Soviet Government
stood far disarmament, for banning the use, production and stockpiling of atomic weapons. The Soviet Government was also in
favor of control. The Soviet proposals on these issues had been set
forth in documents that were still being discussed by the appropriate international bodies.
CONNIFF said that during the talk that Hearst and his companions had with their New York office, their attention had been
drawn to the fact that the sharp tone taken by the Session of the
Supreme Soviet had aroused serious apprehension in the U.S.A.
He would like to ask whether they, as journalists, could do anything to assuage these apprehensions.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that Hearst, Kingsbury Smith and Conniff could make known through the press, or any other medium
they might find convenient, the Soviet Government's sincere desire
for a relaxation of international tension and for peace among the
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peop1es, Its strivIng to Improve reiations with the Unitecl States.
Correct interpretation and objective coverage of what they had
learned in the Soviet Union would be useful, because journalists,
and especially such journalists as he, Bulganin, was talking to today,
had great influence.
HEARST noted that he was a representative of the second generation of journalists and was fully aware of the responsibility that
rested on them.
CONNIFF asked for permission to put a typical American question, a question concerning N. A. Bulganin personally. He asked
whether N. A. Bulganin had anything against such a question.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that that depended upon the question.
CONNIFF asked how N. A. Bulganin had felt when he was
charged with the great responsibility of governing such a great
country as the Soviet Union, and what his personal reaction had
been when he learned about his new appointment.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that he had felt exactly as anyone else
would in the circumstances.
KINGSBURY SMITH expressed deep gratitude to N. A. Bulganin
for finding time to receive them and to reply to their questions.
HEARST said that he and his companions had been given an
opportunity that very few people had ever enjoyed, namely to
meet and talk not with one or two, but with four outstanding
Soviet leaders. He was convinced that such clever people as he
had had the chance to meet in Moscow, people with good intentions and pursuing peaceful aims, should and unquestionably
would find a way to peace.
N. A. BULGANIN thanked Hearst for what he had said.
In conclusion Kingsbury Smith said that Hearst would meet
Churchill in London the following Monday and asked whether
N. A. Bulganin wanted anything to be conveyed to Churchill
unofficially.
He pOinted out at the same time that nothing Bulganin might
say on this score would be published in the press.
N. A. BULGANIN replied that he had nothing to convey.
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INTERVIEW WITH MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

G. K. ZHUKOV
February 7, 1955
Mter a mutual exchange of greetings, Kingsbury Smith noted
that he had been present during the presentation of an American
order to Marshal Zhukov by Eisenhower in Frankfurt-on-Main.
Zhukov said that he recalled with pleasure his meetings with General Eisenhower.
Then the following interview took place:
HEARST: I have heard that General Eisenhower has invited you
to visit the United States.
ZHUKOV: Yes, General Eisenhower has twice invited me to visit
the United States, but unfortunately the state of my health at that
time and urgent business did not allow me to make that trip.
HEARST: Have you been to Britain and France?
ZHUKOV: No, I have been neither to Britain nor to France. Nor
ha ve I been to China or Korea. The American press has reported
tha t I have been there.
KINGSBURY SMITH: Would you agree now to visit the United
States if President Eisenhower were to invite you?
ZHUKOV: So far I have received no invitation, but I think that
the relations existing between our two countries are not conducive
to such a trip at the present time. It would not be understandable
to the American and the Soviet peoples if at the present state of
relations between the USSR and the United States Marshal Zhukov
were to go to the United States. I sincerely desire an improvement
in relations between our two countries. I would like to visit the
United States and if relations improve, I would gladly do so.
HEARST: Just like you, we sincerely desire an improvement in
relations between the USSR and the United States. This is the main
reason for. our coming here.
KINGSBURY SMITH: The American people know nothing about
the Soviet Army since the war ended. What do you think of the
organization of a regular exchange of military missions to improve
mutual understanding?
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ZHUKOV: In order to understand each other properly, it is necessary in the first place to organize normal political, economic and
cultural relations between our countries. An exchange of military
missions only cannot lead to the establishment of proper mutual
understanding.
CONNIFF: Does this mean that you stand for the establishment
of broad relations between our countries?
ZHUKOV: Yes, I, like all Soviet people, stand for such relations,
but I hold that to' exchange only military missions under the existing conditions and relations is useless.
HEARST: Of the three American newspapermen present here,
Conniff is the best informed on military matters, and he would like
to ask you a number of questions.
.
ZHUKOV: I will try to answer the questions that are of interest
to you, although I do not know whether I will be able to satisfy ·
such a big specialist in military affairs as Mr. Conniff.
CONNIFF: The experience of the Soviet-German war is being
studied now in the United States in great detail. There is an opinion among military specialists of the United States that the turning
point in the war was not the Battle of Stalingrad but the rout of
the Germans at Moscow in 1941. What is your opinion?
ZHUKOV: The battle at Moscow demonstrated that the Soviet
Armed Forces were capable not only of repulsing the offensive of
such a serious enemy as the German Army, but also of routing it.
From the very beginning of the war, that is, after the perfidious
attack af Hitlerite Germany on our country, we were fully confident
of victory.
The turning point in the war came as a result of a number of
successful operations carried through in 1941-1942.
After the Battle of Stalingrad, the initiative passed into the
hands of the Soviet Army. It passed over to us cO'mpletely after the
Kursk Battle.
After the Kursk Battle we no longer had any doubts in ultimate
victory.
. HEARST: Did you personally take part in the battle at Moscow
and in the Battle of Stalingrad?
ZHUKOV: By decision of the Committee of Defense I was appointed commander of the troops during the defense of Moscow.
In the Battle of Stalingrad I directed all the preparatory work of
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the Stalingrad operation. The operation itself was cDnducted by
Marshal Vasilevsky. I was busy at that time preparing the subsequent Dffensive operatiDns, which we were going to. undertake in
order not to. give Hitler the chance to maneuver with his forces.
CONNIFF: What do. you consider to. be Hitler's biggest tactical
mistake, except the very fact of attack Dn Russia?
ZHUKOV: YDU apparently mean strategic mistakes?
CONNIFF: Strategic.
ZHUKOV: Hitler~s biggest strategic mistake was the underestimatio.n of the Soviet UniDn's potentialities.
CONNIFF: And tactical?
ZHUKOV: Underestimatio.n of the importance of cODrdination
between different arms, specifically underestimatiDn Df the rDle
of artillery and o.verestimation o.f the ro.le o.f the air force. Hitler
hoped to compensate the shortage of artillery by a strang air
fo.rce, but the air force is too. delicate an arm. It greatly depends an
such factors as the weather and o.ther circumstances.
CONNIFF: What, in YDur Dpinion, was the biggest strategic mistake made by the American military leaders?
ZHUKOV:. I think that it is the Americans who. can give the best
answer to. this question. They must see it better.
KINGSBURY SMITH: The British Air Marshal JDhn SIess or notes
in his latest bDDk that in a future war it will be impossible to avoid
the use Df nuclear weapons. What is YDur opinio.n?
ZHUKOV: UnfDrtunately, such a view is held not Dnly by Marshal
Slessor, but alSo. by a number o.f other big military leaders in
Western Europe and in the United States. We hold a diametrically
Dpposite view. We stand fDr full prohibitiDn Df atomic war, and if
atomic weapons are banned, mankind will Dnly benefit by it. I
think that ato.mic weapDns must be prohibited, just as chemical
weapons were prohibited.
KINGSBURY SMITH: Many military specialists in the United
States consider that if in a future war ato.mic weapons are not used,
Russia will have a considerable advantage in view Df its numerical
superiDrity.
- ZHUKOV: I think that such talk is sheer prattling designed to
befuddle gullible peDple. I would like to stress that we have not
sought and do not seek to unleash war. As fDr atomic and hydrogen
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weapons, you know that we have them too.
HEARST: Very many people in the United States consider that
the fact that both sides have atomic weapons is a guarantee of
peace since no side, fearing atomic attack, will venture to start war.
What is your opinion?
.
ZHUKOV: The existence of atomic weapons ah-eady in itself contains the possibility of using them, and some madmen, disregarding
everything, might venture to use them. Our task is to fight with all
our energy for prohibition of these weapons. I am confident that
the peoples of the world are on our side in this matter and I am
likewise confident that ultimately the people will say their decisive
word. It should be borne in mind that atomic weapons are doubleedged. Atomic war is in the same degree dangerous for those who
are attacked as for those who attack.
CONNIFF: The well-known American General MacArthur said
recently that the fact that both sides have powerful atomic weapons
in itself eliminates the danger of another war breaking out.
ZHUKOV: I consider that this is an erroneous viewpoint. Moreover, such a . presentation of the problem leads to a co.nstant arms
race. Unfortunately, such irresponsible statements have been made
by many prominent military leaders, for example, by Montgomery
and Gruenther.
KINGSBURY SMITH: At the last meeting of the NATO Council,
General Gruenther was instructed to dra w up a plan of defense
based on the premise that atomic weapons would be used in a
future war. Are you preparing the defense of your country against
atomic attack?
ZHUKOV: We have everything necessary for the reliable defense
of our country, but we are also thinking of how to avoid war, proceeding from the principle that even a bad peace is better than a
good fight. If we go over from good words to good deeds, peace
will be secured. Is it not high time to do good deeds?
KINGSBURY SMITH: I think that Eisenhower agrees with you
that peace must be preserved.
ZHUKOV: This is not only my personal opinion. It is the opinion
of the entire Soviet people, the opinion of the Government of the
USSR and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1945,
before General Eisenhower left Germany for the United States, I
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had a long talk with him. Eisenhower told me that the United
States would never attack the USSR. I replied that the USSR would
never lift its hand against the United States. I am confident that in
saying that I made no mistake. I hope that General Eisenhower,
too, will do everything in his power to confirm his words by deeds.
The best way for the United States Government to prove this
would be to liquidate the military bases around the Soviet Union.
You yourself understand that we cannot fail to see the danger these
bases located so close to our frontiers hold for the USSR.
KINGSBURY SMITH: Can it be said that in that conversation two
noted leaders of the armies of two great countries gave a mutual
pledge not to fight against each other?
ZHUKOV: We spoke at that time as military men, and we saw
no grounds whatsoever for war between the USSR and the United
States. Unfortlmately, the situation has changed through no fault
of the Soviet Union. Relations between the USSR and the United
States have worsened and are obviously abnormal. The task is to
restore proper. relations.
HEARST: .1 agree that our bases are located in various countries,
but we have never attacked anyone, even countries located in
direct proximity to the United States. Military bases have been set
up only as a measure of security, as some kind of a police force
directed not against the USSR but against some other country, for
instance, Korea or Indo-China. (At the last remark Kingsbury
Smith and Conniff laughed.)
ZHUKOV: That the United States has never attacked anyone is
historically not true. The United States participated in the intervention against the Soviet Union. It interferes with its armed forces in
the internal affairs of a number of states in Asia. As for the military
bases of the United States, does it not seem to you that they are
located too far from the United States? I could justify their existence to some extent if they were located near the United States
and not in Europe, not in direct proximity to the coast of China
and the frontiers of the USSR. Such location of the military bases
renders unconvincing the explanation that they were set up as a
measure of security. The Soviet people see in the existence of these
bases a direct threat to themselves and to their friends-the People!ls
Democracies and China.

KINGSBURY SMITH: The same question was raised during the'
interview with Mr. Khrushchev and he said that he understood the~
desire of the United States to have a balance of military power for'
its security, but he spoke against the desire of the United States to
achieve superiority in military might. Herein, evidently, lies the:
failure to understand each other. Bases are precisely the means for
achieving balance of power.
ZHUKOV: I am certain that you did not understand Mr. Khrushchev. The location of American bases around the USSR testifies
not to defensive intentions of the United States but to offensive
intentions. We are well versed in these matters. What talk of defense can there be if the bases are so far removed from the object
to be defended, that is the United States? The aim of the establishment of such military bases is attack and not defense.
KL~GSBURY SMITH: Under our obligations to NATO membercountries we must defend not only the United States but also other
countries.
HEARST: In general it is only with the heart that one can understand what the bases are for, for attack or for defense.
ZHUKOV: It seems to me that in such a serious matter reason is
absolutely necessary. The heart makes mistakes at times.
I think that our tasks are not to look for justification of the arms
drive, but to find practical ways of making war impossible. You, of
course, will justify your actions, try to convince us that by surrounding us with your military bases you act properly, but we
have mare weighty reasons not to agree with you.
It seems to me that it is high time to put an end to military competition, since it is too heavy a burden for the people.
HEARST: Military men, soldiers such as Zhukov and Eisenhower,
know better how to preserve peace than to unleash another war.
It seems to me that military men strive to preserve peace.
ZHUKOV: In our country the entire people, including military
men, desire peace and fight for peace. The Soviet people, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are at one in their strug_.
gle for peace. It would be desirable for the American Government~.
too, to go over from words about peace to the defense of peace.,
Such a policy would be approved both by the American people
and all the peoples of the world.

29

· UnfortUnately, a number of factors aggravate the international
situation. The Tahvan (Formosa) affair, for example, appears very
unseemly against the background of peace pronouncements of the
American Government. I cannot understand what the United
States Government needs this bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek for. The
protection of Chiang Kai-shek has seriously undermined the prestige of America. The intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of China has set the people of that country, numbering
many millions, against the United States.
Very often the military might of the USSR is used to frighten
the peoples of Britain and the United States as well as of other
countries, allegations being made that we might act as aggressors.
This is silly prattle. If our country had such a policy and intentions,
it should be said that there were quite enough times when we had
a chance to use our military might. For instance, after the rout of
Hitlerite Germany Europe was very weak, Britain was exhausted.
Toward the end of the war the Soviet Union possessed tremendous
military might. We did not take advantage of the weakness of
Western Europe. Prattle about a military threat on the part of the
USSR has nothing in common with the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union. Frightening the peoples with aggression on the part of the
Soviet Union pursues definite ill-intentioned aims directed not at
the maintenance of peace but at propaganda for another war.
Therefore, an end must be put to this. It is necessary to explain the
erroneousness of such allegations since this harms the cause of peace.
KINGSBURY SMITH: When Europe and the United States were
weak, our diplomats held that the possession of atomic bombs by
our country was a defense against aggression.
ZHuKov: It should be borne in mind that it is impossible to win
a war by atomic bombs alone. Moreover, at that time you had very
few of them-altogether five or six-and they were of no decisive
significance.
.
CONNIFF: You evidently are better informed on this matter than
we are.
ZHuKOV: That was the period of the beginning of atomic bomb
manufacture, and we know from our own experience how complicated it is.
HEARST: During the First World War General Alexander Sibirsky served in the old Russian army. He now lives in the United
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States and is regarded as one of the biggest specialists on the use of
the air force in war. Sibirsky and Field Marshal Montgomery in their
latest statements pointed out that they considered the use of aircraft carriers to be inexpedient at present. As far as we know, the
Soviet Union does not build aircraft carriers but builds mainly submarines and cruisers. What is your opinion on this question?
mUKov: First of all I want to say that there was no General
Sibirsky in the old Russian army. Evidently you are speaking of the
White Guard Seversky who fled to America. To my regret I cannot
answer your question whether aircraft carriers are being built in
the USSR, since lately I have not been concerned with problems
of the Navy. I do not know on what Seversky and Montgomery
based their arguments against aircraft carriers.
I carefully follow all the statements of Field Marshal Montgomery. I think that of late he has turned into a fortune-telling
witch or an oracle.
KL~GSBURY SMITH: I would like to ask you the last question.
Recently General Gruenther publicly stated that he could not picture to himself the defensive capacity of Europe without Germany.
If you were in Gruenther's place, would you agree with him, knowing the strength of your expected enemy?
ZHUKOV: If General Gruenther had known the real intentions
of those whom he considers his enemies, he would not have spoken
the way he did. He would have spoken of friendship and nat of
war. As for Germany as a military ally of the United States, I
doubt the eagerness of the German people to shed their blood for
interests alien to them.
HEARST: I would like to ask you one unofficial question. Soon
after my return to the United States I will meet President Eisenhower. Wouldn't you like to convey anything to him?
ZHUKOV: In the first place I ask you kindly to convey my best
wishes to President Eisenhower. I often recall the time when we
worked together in the Control Council in Berlin. At that time we
did much that was useful. And our good relations promoted good
mutual understanding between our countries. I would like to convey to President Eisenhower my wishes for the restoration of
friendly relations between our countries.
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